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We develop a simple model featuring search frictions and a nondegenerate labor supply decision along
the extensive margin. The model is a standard version of the neoclassical growth model with indivisible
labor with idiosyncratic shocks and frictions characterized by employment loss and employment opportunity
arrival shocks. We argue that it is able to account for the key features of observed labor market flows
for reasonable parameter values. Persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks play a key role in allowing
the model to match the persistence of the employment and out of the labor force states found in individual
labor market histories.
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Analyses of aggregate employment are dominated by two frameworks. One is the frictionless
version of the standard growth model with an endogenous labor leisure choice, as in Kyd-
land and Prescott (1982), but modiﬁed as in Hansen (1985) to include the indivisible labor
formulation of Rogerson (1988). The other is the class of matching models a la Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides, as described in Pissarides (2000). Loosely speaking, the former can
be viewed as a model of labor force participation, while the latter can be viewed as a model
of unemployment conditional on a participation rate. Cross country data reveal that there
are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across countries along all three margins: employment, unemploy-
ment and non-participation. Moreover, it seems reasonable to think that participation rates,
employment rates and unemployment rates are all jointly determined, in the sense that any
policy that aﬀects one margin is likely to aﬀect both of the other two margins. This suggests
that a comprehensive model of the aggregate labor market should explicitly incorporate all
three labor market states.
This paper takes a ﬁrst step toward the development of a uniﬁed model of participation,
unemployment and employment. The model can be seen as a hybrid of the two classes of
models discussed above, extended to allow for idiosyncratic shocks. Abstracting from labor
market frictions, an individual in our model solves a textbook problem of labor supply in a
dynamic setting with indivisible labor. That is, the individual must decide what fraction of
his or her life to spend in employment, and how to arrange the timing of employment relative
2to the idiosyncratic shocks that they experience. A key property of our calibration is that
the solution for lifetime labor supply is interior, i.e., that individuals do not want to work in
every period of life. An individual in our model also faces frictions just like a worker in the
textbook Pissarides model: when employed the individual faces a probability of becoming
non-employed, and when not employed, the individual ﬁnds an employment opportunity only
with some probability.
A natural criterion for assessing the empirical reasonableness of such a hybrid model of
employment, unemployment and participation is that it be able to account for both the dis-
tribution of workers across the three labor market states and the ﬂows of workers between
them. Although our model is purposefully simpliﬁed, we show that empirically reasonable
versions of it satisfy this criterion. Persistent idiosyncratic shocks play a critical role in al-
lowing the model to match the patterns found in the worker ﬂow data. Without idiosyncratic
shocks the model is the same as that studied in Krusell et al (2008), and we show that such
a model is unable to match the ﬂows of workers across states. In addition to capturing the
key features of labor market ﬂows, the model also does a reasonable job of accounting for
several other regularities in the data, such as the distribution of months worked during the
year, and the reasons for separations from employment.
The idiosyncratic shocks in our analysis are intended to capture all of the important shocks
faced by individuals that inﬂuence the static return to working versus not working. Likely
candidates for these shocks are shocks to market opportunities, health shocks, preference
3shocks, and family shocks. An important ﬁnding of our analysis is that the model is able
to account for the labor market ﬂo w sa sl o n ga st h es h o c kp r o c e s si sf a i r l yp e r s i s t e n ta n d
the shocks are sizeable. Both of these seem to be very reasonable assumptions about the
nature of idiosyncratic shocks. In this sense we conclude that our model does a good job of
accounting for the ﬂows even though we do not have good measures of some of the underlying
shocks that our model is seeking to capture.
While we view our benchmark model as being successful in accounting for the key features
of aggregate labor market ﬂows, there are discrepancies between the model and the data
along some dimensions. Given the simplicity of our model, we believe it presents a natural
framework to be used to assess the role of various extensions in resolving these discrepancies.
Our analysis is related to many papers in the literature. In addition to the work cited
above, our paper is similar to Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), Alvarez and Veracierto (1999),
Gomes et al (2001) and Veracierto (2008) in that these papers all introduce frictions into
an otherwise standard version of the growth model. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006, 2008)
consider models that feature indivisible labor and frictions. Merz, Andolfatto, Gomes et al
and Ljungqvist and Sargent do not consider unemployment and nonparticipation as distinct
states. The other two papers do consider all three labor market states but their model only
puts restrictions on the stocks of workers in the three states and does not pin down labor
market ﬂows. A further key distinction between our model and all of these analyses is that
these models all have the property that if frictions were removed, the employment rate would
4be equal to one, with labor supply adjustment occurring only along the intensive margin.
Beginning with Burdett et al (1984), there are also several papers that have extended the
simple matching model to allow for nonparticipation.1 These models assume linear utility
and therefore implicitly impose assumptions on the income and substitution eﬀects that
govern labor supply that are not consistent with standard speciﬁcations of labor supply.
Additionally, they cannot address issues in which risk sharing plays a key role.
Lastly, our work is related to a recent literature that studies labor supply in settings with
incomplete markets and idiosyncratic shocks, including papers by Domeij and Floden (2006),
Floden and Linde (2001), Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) and Pijoan-Mas (2006). None of these
papers allows for trading frictions. Similar to us, Meghir et al (2008) consider a model with
frictions and a nondegenerate labor supply decision. They consider a richer model of frictions
and income support programs, but their analysis is partial equilibrium and they address very
diﬀerent issues than we do.
An outline of the paper follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 describes the
calibration of the model and presents the implications of the benchmark calibrated model
for labor market ﬂows. Section 4 considers an alternative calibration procedure and Section
5 examines sensitivity of the results to changes in the idiosyncratic shock process. Section 6
concludes.
1Other examples include Andolfatto and Gomme (1996), Andolfatto et al (1998), Kim (2001), Yip (2003),
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), and Pries and Rogerson (2008).
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The economy is populated by a continuum of workers with total mass equal to one. All





where ct ≥ 0 is consumption in period t, et ∈ {0,1} is time devoted to work in period t,
0 <β <1 is the discount factor and α>0 is the disutility of work. The restriction that et
is either zero or one reﬂects the assumption that labor is indivisible, so that all adjustment
occurs along the extensive margin. A key feature of the model is that workers are subject to
idiosyncratic shocks that aﬀect the relative payoﬀs to working or not working in a particular
period. In reality there are many shocks that serve this role: shocks to market opportunities,
shocks to home production opportunities, health shocks, family shocks, preference shocks,
etc... To maintain parsimony, we model the net eﬀect of all of these shocks as a single shock,
and represent it as a shock to market opportunities. In particular, we assume that workers are
subject to idiosyncratic shocks that aﬀect the quantity of labor services that they contribute
if working. We denote this value by s and assume that it follows an AR(1) stochastic process
in logs:
logst+1 = ρlogst + εt+1
where 0 <ρ<1 is the persistence parameter and the innovation εt is a mean zero normally
distributed random variable, with standard deviation σε. T h i sp r o c e s si st h es a m ef o ra l l
6workers, but realizations are iid across workers. The reader should keep in mind that these
market opportunity shocks are standing in for the combined eﬀect of many shocks that aﬀect
the relative value of working versus not working. As a practical matter, we could have
alternatively assumed that the single shock aﬀects the disutility of working α instead of the
return to working.
We formulate equilibrium recursively. In each period there are competitive markets for
output, capital services and labor services.2 In particular, as in Huggett (1993), there are
no insurance markets, so individuals will potentially accumulate assets to self-insure. In
what follows we will focus on steady state equilibria, so that factor prices will be constant.
We normalize the price of output to equal one in all periods, let r denote the rental price
for a unit of capital, and let w denote the rental price for a unit of labor services. If a
worker with productivity s chooses to work then he or she would contribute s units of labor
services and therefore earn ws in labor income. We assume that individuals are not allowed
to borrow, which is equivalent to assuming that capital holdings must be nonnegative. There
i sag o v e r n m e n tt h a tt a x e sl a b o ri n c o m ea tc o n s t a n tr a t eτ and uses the proceeds to ﬁnance
a lump-sum transfer payment T subject to a period-by-period balanced budget constraint.
In steady state, the period budget equation for an individual with kt units of capital and
productivity st is given by:
ct + kt+1 = rkt +( 1− τ)wstet +( 1− δ)kt + T.
2As in Lucas and Prescott (1974), we assume that frictions inﬂuence a worker’s access to the labor market.
But conditional on access, the market operates competitively.











Output can be used either as consumption or investment, and capital depreciates at rate δ.










It follows that Lt = StEt.
To capture frictions in the labor market, we assume that there are two islands, which
we refer to as the production island and the leisure island. At the end of period t − 1 an
individual is either on the production island or the leisure island, depending upon whether
they worked during the period. That is, as of the end of period t−1,aw o r k e rw h ow o r k e di n
period t − 1 will be on the production island, and an individual who did not work in period
t − 1 will be on the leisure island. At the beginning of period t each individual will observe
the realizations of several shocks. First, each individual receives a new realization for the
8value of their idiosyncratic productivity shock. Second, each individual on the production
island observes the realization of an iid separation shock: with probability σ the individual
is relocated to the leisure island. Third, each individual on the leisure island, including those
that have been relocated on account of the separation shock, observes the realization of an
iid employment opportunity shock: with probability λw an individual is relocated to the
production island. Loosely speaking, σ is the exogenous job separation rate, and λw is the
exogenous job arrival rate. After all of these shocks have been realized, each individual on
the production island decides whether to work and how much to consume. An individual
who is on the production island and chooses not to work will then be on the leisure island at
the end of period t and will therefore not have the opportunity to return to the production
island until receiving a favorable employment opportunity shock. An individual who is on
the leisure island after the realization of all of the shocks is not allowed to supply labor,
so his or her only choice is how much to consume. Note that this individual still has two
sources of income: income from renting out capital services and the transfer payment from
the government. This individual will be on the leisure island at the end of period t.
A worker’s state consists of his or her location at the time that the labor supply decision
needs to be made, the level of asset holdings, and productivity. Let W(k,s) be the maximum
value for an individual who works given that they have productivity s and capital holdings
k,a n dl e tN(k,s) denote the maximum value for an individual who does not work given that
9he or she has productivity s and capital holdings k.D e ﬁne V (k,s) by:
V (k,s)=m a x {W(k,s),N(k,s)}.
The Bellman equations for W and N are given by:
W(k,s)=m a x
c,k0 {log(c) − α + βEs0[(1 − σ + σλw)V (k0,s 0)+σ(1 − λw)N(k0,s 0)]}
s.t. c + k0 = rk +( 1− τ)ws+( 1− δ)k + T
c ≥ 0, k0 ≥ 0
and
N(k,s)=m a x
c,k0 {log(c)+βEs0[λwV (k0,s 0)+( 1− λw)N(k0,s 0)]}
s.t. c + k0 = rk +( 1− δ)k + T
c ≥ 0, k0 ≥ 0.
Let μ(k,s,l) denote the measure of individuals over individual states after all of the idiosyn-
cratic shocks have been realized and before any decisions have been taken, where l indexes
location and can take on the two values 0 and 1,w i t hl =1indicating the production island.
T h e r ea r et h r e ed e c i s i o nr u l e s :o n ef o rc,o n ef o rk0, and one for e (which can only take on
the values of 0 or 1).
102.1 Properties of Decision Rules
It is useful to discuss some features of the decision rules in order to gain some intuition
about the forces that shape individual choices in the steady state equilibrium. It is trivial to
show that the value functions are increasing in both assets and the level of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock. One can then show that the decision rules have some simple reservation
properties. Speciﬁcally, for a given level of assets, it turns out that the work decision for
an individual on the production island is characterized by a reservation rule in terms of the
idiosyncratic productivity: work if productivity is above some threshold s∗(k). Similarly,
one can show that for a given productivity level, the work decision for an individual on the
production island is also characterized by a reservation rule in terms of assets: work if assets
are below some threshold k∗(s). It also follows that s∗(k) and k∗(s) are both increasing
functions. The fact that s∗(k) is increasing reﬂects the fact that higher assets lead to a
positive wealth eﬀect, eﬀectively lowering labor supply. The fact that k∗(s) is increasing
reﬂects intertemporal substitution eﬀects of optimal labor supply: an individual wants to
work when productivity is high and enjoy leisure when productivity is low.
3 Accounting for Labor Market Flows
The model described in the previous section is a relatively simple extension of the standard
growth model that serves as the benchmark for many aggregate analyses. In this section we
assess the extent to which this extension can account for the salient features of labor market
11ﬂows in addition to the standard aggregate observations. Given the simplicity of the model
there is no presumption that it can account for all the features found in the data. The issue of
interest here is to assess the extent to which it can capture the key features of the ﬂows that
are found in the data, and isolate those dimensions, if any, along which the model cannot do
a good job of replicating the data.
3.1 Measurement of Flows
In this section we describe how we will connect our model with the data on labor market ﬂows.
Our model oﬀers a very natural distinction among non-employed workers. In particular, there
are some non-employed workers who would like to work but do not have the opportunity, and
others who do not want to work even if presented with the opportunity. To us it seems natural
to label the ﬁrst group as unemployed (U) and the second group as non-participants (N).
While this notion of unemployment is diﬀerent than that used by statistical agencies, data
gathered by the BLS does allow us to compute the counterpart to this notion of unemployment
in the data. That is, the BLS does ask people if they would like to work independently of
whether they engaged in active search in the previous four weeks. In what follows, we will
use this notion to compute the unemployment rate in the data. This leads to a larger pool
of individuals in the unemployment state than does the standard deﬁnition, which is based
largely on the individual’s level of search eﬀort. For the period 1994-2007, which is the
period for which consistent data is available, the standard unemployment rate for the US
averages 5.1%, whereas our expanded notion of unemployment averages 8.3%.G i v e n t h a t
12we provide a diﬀerent split of the non-employed into the unemployment and out of the labor
force states, we also need to correct the data on ﬂows between the states. The appendix
details the procedure that we use to construct these ﬂows. Table 1 shows the eﬀects of the
adjustment.
Table 1
Actual and Adjusted Flows in the Data
US 1994-2007 Adjusted
FROM TO FROM TO
EUN EUN
E 0.962 0.013 0.025 E 0.960 0.021 0.019
U 0.276 0.501 0.223 U 0.248 0.517 0.235
N 0.044 0.026 0.929 N 0.036 0.045 0.919
The eﬀect of this adjustment is quite minor. As one would expect, there is a slight decline
in the ﬂow rate from U to E, since we are expanding the size of U and including those who
in general transition into employment with lower probability. Note also that the alternative
notion of U has relatively little eﬀect on the ﬂows between U and N; in fact, these ﬂows are
now somewhat larger.
Given the fact that the ﬂows for the two diﬀerent deﬁnitions are so similar, there is rel-
atively little need to think about which measure is preferable. Nonetheless, we think some
discussion about our choice of a non-standard split between unemployment and out of the
labor force is worthwhile. While our model oﬀers a sharp distinction between these two
groups, in reality the distinction is somewhat less clear. Standard practice among statistical
agencies is to use information on the extent of search eﬀort as the key criterion to divide
the non-employed between unemployment and not in the labor force. A recent literature has
13questioned whether the rules by which statistical agencies allocate individuals between these
three states is the most useful from the perspective of characterizing economic behavior.
Using data from Canada, Jones and Riddell (1999) showed that the active search criterion
used by many statistical agencies to determine the allocation of workers between the unem-
ployed state and the out of the labor force state is potentially misleading because it excludes
a group of workers (whom they call marginally attached) who say that they would like a
job but have not actively searched in the last four weeks. These workers do have somewhat
lower transition rates into employment than do active searchers, by about twenty-ﬁve per-
cent, though the job ﬁnding rates for the marginally attached workers are the same as those
of active searchers who report reading job ads or visiting a public employment oﬃce as their
sole method of active search. In contrast, the marginally attached workers have transition
rates into employment that are more than 4 times as high as the other non-participants. We
conclude from this that the marginally attached workers (i.e., passive searchers) are more
similar to unemployed workers than they are to nonparticipants. These same ﬁndings have
emerged when this analysis has been repeated for many other countries.3
A related issue was noted much earlier by Clark and Summers (1979), who argued that
in many cases what the statistical agencies view as a series of short unemployment spells
punctuated by spells of nonparticipation are in fact better interpreted as a long spell of
3For example, see Brandolini, Cipoline and Viviano (2006) for an analysis of several European countries,
Garrido and Toharia (2004) for Spain, Gray, Heath and Hunter (2005) for Australia and Marzano (2006) for
the United Kingdom.
14unemployment where the individual’s reported search eﬀort varies over time.4 This may
occur, for example, when an individual has already applied to many jobs and is simply
awaiting responses. It may also reﬂect the fact that an individual is expecting an oﬀer from
earlier search activity and is therefore not currently engaged in active search, even though
he or she is actively pursuing particular employment opportunities.
A ﬁnal issue has to do with the cost of active search. The relatively new American
Time Use Survey that is conducted as part of the Current Population Survey reveals that
active searchers devote very little time to search, typically less than one hour per week. This
suggests that the cost of active search is best thought of as being quite small. If the cost
of active search is actually very small, and given the dynamic nature of search, the decision
of whether to engage in active search at a given point in time may not be very meaningful.
This would also suggest that allocating individuals to various states on the basis of active
search may not be prudent. Consistent with the evidence that the cost of active search is
very small, our model has not placed any emphasis on search costs and likewise our deﬁnition
of unemployment also does not stress search eﬀort.
Having raised all of these issues, we note that there is an interpretation of our model that
would also ﬁt with standard deﬁnitions of unemployment based on active search. Speciﬁcally,
if we assumed that the search eﬀort decision is a binary decision, and that the cost of search
is positive but arbitrarily small, then it would follow that all individuals who prefer working
4Abowd and Zellner (1985) and Poterba and Summers (1986) have devised methods to purge the data of
truly spurious transitions between unemployment and not in the labor force.
15to nonworking given their current state would engage in active search. In this sense one could
connect our model with the active search criterion used by the BLS and use the standard
measure of unemployment. However, because the ﬂows are not very much aﬀected by the
deﬁnition of unemployment, this alternative way of connecting with the data has little impact
on the results of our analysis. Put somewhat diﬀerently, if one views the standard deﬁnition of
unemployment and our deﬁnition of unemployment as two extreme choices, with a continuum
of intermediate choices lying in between these two, the basic message is that this choice is not
very important for the issues that we address here. Nonetheless, in what follows we will base
our comparison on the adjusted numbers in Table 1 since we think those numbers represent
the most natural way to connect the model with the data.
3.2 Flows for Subgroups
Before proceeding to the calibration of the model we think it is of interest to look at labor
market ﬂows for some subgroups in the population. We begin by looking at how labor market
ﬂows diﬀer for men and women. If these ﬂows were dramatically diﬀerent it might suggest
that our approach of using a model with single agent households to account for aggregate
ﬂows is questionable. Table 2 presents the ﬂows for men and women.5
5In the interest of space we do not present the ﬂows for standard deﬁnitions of U. Similar to the case of
the aggregate data, there is little diﬀerence between the adjusted and unadjusted for the subgroups as well.
16Table 2
Flows For Men and Women
Men Women
FROM TO FROM TO
EUN EUN
E 0.961 0.022 0.017 E 0.959 0.021 0.020
U 0.289 0.539 0.172 U 0.209 0.495 0.295
N 0.045 0.049 0.906 N 0.030 0.043 0.927
The table shows that most of the ﬂows are very similar. The two exceptions seem to be
the ﬂows from U to E and from U to N. Women experience much larger ﬂows from U to N,
with a roughly similar decrease in the rate at which they ﬂow from U to E. Conditional on
not moving into N,t h eﬂow rates from U to E are more similar, .349 for men and .297 for
women. We shall return to a discussion of U to N ﬂows later in the paper, as this will prove
to be a dimension along which our model does not perform well.
A second dimension of interest is age. The data that we presented above was for all
individuals aged 16 and older. One concern might be that the bulk of the action in terms of
labor market ﬂows comes from the very young and the very old. Table 3 reports the ﬂows
for individuals between the ages of 21 and 65.
Table 3
Flows By Age and Gender
Men 21-65 Women 21-65 Total 21-65
FROM TO FROM TO FROM TO
EUN EUN EUN
E 0.974 0.017 0.012 E 0.964 0.018 0.018 E 0.968 0.017 0.015
U 0.301 0.602 0.097 U 0.195 0.554 0.251 U 0.245 0.577 0.178
N 0.064 0.060 0.876 N 0.053 0.049 0.898 N 0.056 0.052 0.892
17Eliminating the youngest and oldest workers does not appreciably change the nature of
the ﬂows, neither at the aggregate level or disaggregated by gender. For future reference we
note again that the ﬂows from U to N are decreased relative to the total population.
Lastly, we consider an even narrower group, examining the ﬂows for individuals aged 25
to 54. The results are in Table 4.
Table 4
Flows By Gender, Prime Aged Individuals
Men 25-54 Women 25-54 Total 25-54
FROM TO FROM TO FROM TO
EUN EUN EUN
E 0.978 0.017 0.006 E 0.966 0.017 0.017 E 0.972 0.017 0.011
U 0.296 0.583 0.121 U 0.196 0.556 0.248 U 0.242 0.569 0.189
N 0.068 0.081 0.852 N 0.065 0.059 0.877 N 0.065 0.064 0.871
The patterns remain very similar to those in the earlier tables. In particular, we want
to emphasize that both the magnitude and qualitative properties of the ﬂows seem to be
quite similar across the population, suggesting that abstracting from explicit modeling of
demographic factors such as age and gender seems a reasonable starting point.
3.3 Benchmark Calibration
Having described how we will measure ﬂows across states in the data and the model, in this
section we consider the issue of how well this model can account for the data in Table 1.
The model has nine parameters that need to be assigned: preference parameters β and α,
production parameters θ and δ, idiosyncratic shock parameters ρ and σe, frictional parameters
σ and λw,a n dt h et a xr a t eτ. The length of a period will matter for many of the parameter
18values. We will be interested in the behavior of worker ﬂows between labor market states and
since this data is available at a monthly frequency, we set the length of a period equal to one
month. Because our model is a variation of the standard growth model, we can choose some
of these parameter values using the same procedure that is typically used to calibrate versions
of the growth model. Given that our model assumes incomplete markets and uncertainty, our
steady state cannot be represented analytically in the same fashion as the standard growth
model, and in particular one cannot isolate the connection between certain parameters and
target values. Nonetheless, it is still useful and intuitive to associate particular targets and
parameter values. Speciﬁcally, we set θ = .3 to target a capital share of .3,c h o o s eδ so
that the steady state ratio of investment to output is equal to .2, and choose the discount
factor β to target an annual real rate of return on capital equal to 4%. The other preference
parameter α, which captures the disutility of working, is set so that the steady state value
of employment is equal to .632. This is the value of the employment to population ratio for
the population aged 16 and older for the period 1994 − 2007.6
The tax rate is set at τ = .30. Following the work of Mendoza et al (1994) there are
several papers which produce estimates of the average eﬀective tax rate on labor income
across countries. Examples include Prescott (2004) and McDaniel (2006). There are minor
variations in methods across these studies, which do produce some small diﬀerences in the
estimates, and the value .30 is chosen as representative of these estimates.7
6We calibrate to values for the period 1994-2007 because this is the period for which we have consistent
measures of labor market ﬂows for our deﬁnition of unemployment.
7Note that Prescott (2004) makes an adjustment to the average labor tax rate to arrive at a marginal tax
19The remaining parameters are the two frictional parameters, λw and σ,a n dt h et w o
parameters of the shock process, ρ and σε. Our basic goal is to assess the extent to which
there are values of these four parameters for which our relatively simple model can account
for the distribution of workers across the three labor market states and the ﬂows of workers
between these states, and if so, to what extent these values seem reasonable. It is important
to recall that we want to think of our shock process as capturing a variety of diﬀerent types
of shocks that inﬂuence the relative value to working and not working, so that we do not
want to limit our attention to a single component of this process, such as wage shocks.
One way to proceed would be to search over parameter vectors (λw,σ,ρ,σε) so as to
minimize the diﬀerence between a set of moments in the model and the data. It turns out
that there are many speciﬁcations that do similarly well at accounting for the data, and hence
we feel that it is more informative to proceed in a slightly diﬀerent manner. In particular,
we will calibrate the two frictions so as to match two targets in the data, and then ask how
the resulting labor market ﬂows are aﬀected by diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the shock process.
Note ﬁrst that λw is a key parameter in generating unemployment in our model. Speciﬁ-
cally, if λw =1 , then everyone always has the opportunity to work, and as a result there will
be no workers unemployed according to the deﬁnition that we are using. As λw is lowered
from one there will be more workers in the situation of wanting to work but not having the
opportunity. Motivated by this, we choose λw so that the steady state unemployment rate
rate that is roughly 40%. For purposes of computing the eﬀect of changes in taxes this adjustment plays no
role.
20in our model (i.e., U/(E + U))i se q u a lt o.083, which is the average value for our notion of
the unemployment rate in the US data for the period 1994 − 2007.
Next consider σ. Intuitively, this parameter will play a large role in shaping the transitions
from employment to unemployment. The reason for this is that anyone who transitions from
employment to unemployment must have been hit with a separation shock, since otherwise
they would still have an employment opportunity and could therefore not end up both not
working and wanting to work. Although there is a strong relationship between the incidence
of separation shocks and transitions from E to U, they are not identical, for two diﬀerent
reasons. First, an individual may experience both a separation shock and a negative shock
to idiosyncratic productivity, and hence prefer not to work. Second, our timing convention
allows a worker that experiences a separation shock to also obtain a new employment oppor-
tunity in the same period, so that he or she would not show up as unemployed. Nonetheless,
there is still a close connection between the ﬂow from E to U and the value of σ, so we will
use this ﬂow to pin down the value of σ. For our benchmark case we target the ﬂow rate
from employment to unemployment of .021, which is again the average value for this ﬂow for
the period 1994−2007. Note that for the two reasons just mentioned, the value of σ will be
larger than this value.
The above procedure describes how we set the values of all other parameters for given
choices of ρ and σε. By construction we will necessarily generate the same distribution of
workers across states as is found in the US data, since our procedure targets both E and U.
21What we seek to assess is the extent to which the model can capture the key features found
in the ﬂow data, and if so whether the resulting values of ρ and σε seem to be empirically
reasonable. The main result of this exercise is that the ﬂow data generated by the model are
quite similar for a very large set of values for ρ and σε. As we show below in more detail, the
results are quite similar as long as the shocks are relatively persistent, say with an annualized
persistence parameter at least equal to .5, and for a wide range of values of σε.
In terms of describing the results it is useful to initially focus on one particular speci-
ﬁcation, even though there are other speciﬁcations that seem equally reasonable. For our
benchmark we choose values for ρ and σε so that if the annualized data were estimated by
an AR(1) it would have persistence parameter .92 and standard deviations of innovations
equal to .21.8 These values correspond to one set of estimates of idiosyncratic wage shocks
for prime-aged working males, as reported in Floden and Linde (2001).9 We emphasize again
that we do not consider wage shocks to be the only important source of shocks, and that in
addition we want to capture shocks that are relevant for all individuals, not simply prime
age employed males. Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests that other shocks, such as
health shocks, are also persistent, so we think a persistent shock process seems a reasonable
benchmark.
Table 5 shows our calibrated parameter values for our benchmark model.





1 − ρ2 with Tauchen (1986) method.
9Other papers that provide similar estimates are Card (1994) and French (2005).
22Table 5
Benchmark Calibrated Parameter Values
θδ βαρ σ e λw στ
.30 .0067 .9967 .547 .9931 .1017 .436 .039 .30
3.4 Properties of the Steady State
The only ﬂow rate that we targeted in the calibration was the ﬂow from E into U.N e x tw e
examine the predictions of the calibrated model for the other ﬂo w sa sw e l l . T a b l e6s h o w s
the ﬂow rates from the data and from our calibrated model.
Table 6
Flows in the Model and Data
Adjusted US 1994-2007 Model
FROM TO FROM TO
EUN EUN
E 0.960 0.021 0.019 E 0.947 0.021 0.032
U 0.248 0.517 0.235 U 0.407 0.527 0.066
N 0.036 0.045 0.919 N 0.034 0.044 0.922
Given that ﬂows out of each state must sum to one, there are really six independent
values in the data. Our calibration procedure targeted the ﬂow rate from E to U,l e a v i n g
ﬁve independent ﬂows.10 Two key features of the data are the very high persistence for both
the E and N states. Our calibrated model not only generates a lot of persistence in these two
states, but also matches the corresponding values in the data very well. Persistence in the
unemployment state is much less than in the other two states. Our model also captures this
regularity, though the model generates slightly more persistence in this state than is found
10Given that we target the shares of E, U and N in the data we do implicitly impose some additional
restrictions on the ﬂows. But when we consider the case of no productivity shocks we will see that this by
itself does not generate a close match for the ﬂows.
23in the data. One simple metric to gauge the model’s ability to capture the persistence of
the three states is to compute expected spell durations for each state. Measured in months,
the duration of E, U,a n dN spells in the model are 18.7, 2.1 and 13.0 respectively. The
corresponding values in the (adjusted) data are given by 22.5, 2.0 and 14.3.T h e s ev a l u e sa r e
all close.
Given the high persistence of the E and N states and the fact that the model accounts
for these values quite well, it follows that the remaining ﬂows out of E and N are also
necessarily quite close in the model and the data. The ﬂows for which the discrepancies are
largest between the model and the data are the ﬂows involving U: the model predicts that
the U to U ﬂow is too large, that the U to N ﬂow is too low and that the U to E ﬂow is
too large. Several remarks are in order concerning these discrepancies. First, because we
calibrate the model to as to match the level of unemployment and the ﬂow of workers into U
from E, there is a sense in which a large discrepancy in the U to N ﬂow will necessarily do a
large discrepancy in the U to E ﬂow. To see this, note that given a ﬂow of workers entering
unemployment, the same number must leave unemployment in order to maintain the stock.
So if they are not leaving to N they must instead by leaving to E. From this we conclude
that the large discrepancy concerning ﬂow out of U is really one dimensional in nature.
An alternative measure of interest is the probability that a worker moves from U to E
conditional on not moving to N. In the data this value is .36, while in the model it is
.43. Although a discrepancy remains, the diﬀerence is much smaller than the discrepancy in
24ﬂows from U to E. A second and related issue that is relevant for this comparison is that
discrepancies associated with ﬂows out of the E and N states are necessarily magniﬁed in
terms of consequences for ﬂows out of the U state. The reason for this is that the stock of
workers in the U state is much less than in the other two states. In relative terms, the stock
of employed workers is more than ten times the stock of unemployed workers, and the stock
of nonparticipating workers is more than ﬁve times the stock of unemployed workers. To see
why this matters, note that the ﬂow of workers leaving the employment state in the model is
about one percent too high relative to the data. Given that we target the stock of employed
workers, it follows that the ﬂow into employment must also be higher in the model than in
the data. But a one percent discrepancy relative to the stock of employed workers is roughly
a ten percent discrepancy relative to the stock of unemployed workers.
The relatively large ﬂow between U and N i nt h ed a t ar e l a t i v et ot h em o d e lc a nb e
interpreted in many ways. First, empirical evidence suggests that this ﬂow is dominated by
transitions that are reversed in the following period. Speciﬁc a l l y ,b a s e do nt h ea n a l y s i si n
Jones and Riddell (2006), one ﬁnds that the transition rate from U to N at a ﬁve month
horizon is only a fraction of what would be predicted on the basis of the monthly numbers.11
This implies that these ﬂows are transitory in nature. One possibility is that this reﬂects
survey response error, since those individuals who are not employed and are nearly indiﬀerent
between working and not working might be expected to have noisy answers to the question
11The analysis of Jones and Riddell is based on Canadian data, but given that the patterns in the monthly
ﬂow data are similar, there is good reason to think that their ﬁndings would also apply to US data.
25of whether they would like to work. A second possibility is that there is a transitory shock
which induces a lot of high frequency transitions between the two states.
A simple back of the envelope calculation is somewhat informative. Assume, for example,
that in each period, 15% of people in the U state misclassify themselves as being in N,a n d
simultaneously, the same number of workers in N misclassify themselves as being in U.I fw e
simply recompute the ﬂows out of N and U using the ﬂows as in Table 5 but weighting each
group using the appropriate weights for the fraction of each type in N and U,t h er e s u l t s
are as follows. The ﬂow from U to N increases to .26 and the ﬂow from U to E decreases
to .351.T h e ﬂow from N to U increases to .076 while the ﬂow from N to E is eﬀectively
unchanged at .044. We conclude that this mechanism, whether driven by survey response
error or temporary shocks, can go quite far in reconciling some of the discrepancies between
the ﬂows in Table 5 and those in the data. We do not pursue this issue further in this paper,
but note that to the extent that much of the discrepancy reﬂects transitions for individuals
near an indiﬀerence boundary, we suspect that it is not of ﬁrst order importance.
One ﬁnal comment is that if one compares the ﬂows in the benchmark model to those
reported earlier for males aged 21-65 or 25-54, the model ﬂows are quite a bit closer, and
even a relatively small amount of survey response error makes them very similar.12
One additional statistic implied by the ﬂows that is of interest has to do with the nature
of ﬂows into employment. As noted in the introduction, one of the objectives of the current
12One qualiﬁcation that should be noted concerning this comparison is that the distribution of workers across
states for men aged 21-65 or 25-54 is not the same as that for the total population, though the diﬀerences are
not so large.
26paper is to develop a model in which transitions into employment from both U and N occur in
equilibrium as opposed to being all from either one or the other as in the standard frictionless
and frictional models. From this perspective it is of interest to compute the mass of workers
that move into E from each of the other two states. These volumes are given by multiplying
the mass of workers in the respective states by the corresponding ﬂow rate into E.I n t h e
data the mass of workers moving from U to E and from N to E are .014 and .011 respectively.
In the benchmark calibration displayed above these values are .023 and .011. It follows that
our benchmark has relatively too many of the workers that enter employment coming from
unemployment. This is related to the fact that the ﬂow from U to E is somewhat too high in
the model relative to the data, an issue that we discuss more below. However, if we believe
that there is response error in how individuals classify themselves between U and N,t h e n
some of the U to E ﬂows in our model would presumably show up as N to E ﬂows in the
data, which would also bring the model’s values closer to those in the data. In fact if we
were to do the same crude calculation as above, these values would be .020 and .013,w h i c h
is closer to those found in the data.
To summarize, while our model with a single source of heterogeneity and constant frictions
across individuals does not perfectly replicate the ﬂows found in the data, it does capture
many of the key features of the ﬂows observed in the data, both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively. The one caveat concerns the ﬂows of workers from U to N, which is concentrated
among certain subgroups of the population. We conclude that the benchmark calibration
27displayed above represents an empirically reasonable description of the relative importance
of standard labor supply considerations and frictions in the overall US economy.
3.5 Additional Statistics
While our emphasis in evaluating the performance of the model was on the ﬂo w sa sr e p o r t e d
in Table 1, there are many other statistics that are also of possible interest. In this section
we report on some of these additional statistics.
The ﬁrst statistic that we consider has to do with reasons for transitions out of em-
ployment. Speciﬁcally, in our model we can isolate three diﬀerent reasons for a worker to
transition out of employment. One is that the worker might receive a lower value of the
idiosyncratic shock and choose not to work. A second is that the worker receives a separa-
tion shock and does not simultaneously receive a new employment opportunity shock. And
third, it is possible that a worker does not receive any shocks but still chooses to transition
out of employment. This could result if the worker were to accumulate assets beyond the
reservation value k∗(s) deﬁned earlier. As a practical matter it is possible that a worker
receives multiple shocks, thereby complicating this labelling process. We label the reasons
for leaving employment as follows. We ﬁrst ask whether the worker has the opportunity to
work. If the answer is no, and the worker would have worked given the current realization
of s and their current assets, then we say that the reason for the transition of out E is a
separation shock. If the individual did have the opportunity to work, then we check whether
the individual would have worked this period if instead of their current realization of s they
28had the same value for s this period as last period; i.e., whether they would have worked if
there had been no change in the value of their productivity. If the answer to this is yes, then
we say that the reason for the transition out of employment is the productivity shock. The
residual is what we label ”other”. The results are shown in Table 7.
Table 7
Reason for Transitions out of E
σ Shock s Shock Other
.41 .47 .12
Note that productivity shocks are the dominant source of transitions out of E.Ar e l a t e d
statistic concerns reasons for the ﬂow into unemployment. In our model there are two ﬂows
into unemployment: one from employment and the other from not in the labor force. Those
that ﬂow from employment into unemployment are necessarily individuals who were hit by
the σ shock. In this sense it is natural to label them as job losers. In steady state, 38% of
the new ﬂows into unemployment represent job losers.
Both of these statistics can be compared to measures in the data. Over the period 1994-
2008 the fraction of new ﬂows into unemployment accounted for by job losers is around 49%,
so our model is a bit low on this measure. In the JOLTS data set, which covers 2000-2008,
38% of all separations are labelled as involuntary. Some care needs to be taken in comparing
this statistic to our model since we do not have any job to job ﬂows in our model, and in
reality many voluntary separations are associated with job to job ﬂows. Additionally, the
work of Davis et al (2008) shows that due to sampling issues, the JOLTS ﬁgures tend to
underestimate involuntary separations. Their revised numbers suggest that the fraction of












Figure 1: Distribution of Months Worked During the Year
all separations that are involuntary is closer to 45%.
Another statistic that we can look at is the distribution of months worked during a
particular year.13 Both in the data and in the model the transitions between states are not
iid over time; that is, there is substantial heterogeneity across workers in terms of expected
transition rates, and the persistence of these rates. Looking at how time spent employed
accumulates over the year is one way to assess the model’s ability to capture these more
complex aspects of the ﬂow data. Figure 1 plots the distributions of weeks worked during
the year for both our model and the data.
The data represent averages for the CPS over the period 1994-2008. While the data
has slightly more mass in the two tails, the model does a reasonable job of capturing the
13In the data respondents report data on weeks worked during the previous year. We convert this to months
by rounding to the nearest integer number of months.
30distribution found in the data. In the next section we will consider sensitivity to changes in
the idiosyncratic shock process. Some of the alternative processes that we consider produce
slightly more persistence in the E and N states, and yield an even closer match to the months
worked distribution.
4 An Alternative Calibration: Matching the U to E Flow
One of the properties of our benchmark calibration is that it generated too large of a ﬂow
from U to E. We argued that this discrepancy was mitigated somewhat by dealing with the
U to N ﬂow. Because the U to E ﬂow seems central in many applications, we think it is
important to demonstrate that there is nothing inherent in our model that prevents us from
matching the U to E ﬂow as well as the other ﬂows (with the exception of the U to N ﬂow).
To show this, in this section we adopt a diﬀerent calibration strategy in which we explicitly
target the U to E ﬂo wi n s t e a do ft h es t o c ko fw o r k e r si nU. This would be consistent with
a view that many of the U to N ﬂows are spurious transitions for individuals who should be
continuously classiﬁed as U.14
In our benchmark calibration we chose the value of λw so as to target the level of unem-
ployment in the steady state, having argued that there was intuitively a close link between
the two. We begin by displaying the nature of this relationship. To do this we set λw to
an arbitrary value and then calibrate all of the remaining parameters in the same fashion as
above, except that we no longer match the steady state unemployment rate in the data. Note
14More generally, we could also consider some mismeasurement of E, and so not match the employed stock.
31that we continue to set the preference parameter α so that the steady state employment rate
does match the target value of .632 found in the data. Table 8 gives the results.
Table 8
λw and the Steady State Unemployment Rate
λw =1 .0 λw =0 .6 λw =0 .436 λw =0 .4 λw =0 .2
.000 .056 .083 .090 .155
In the extreme case in which λw =1 , any individual who wants to work at the going wage
rate can do so, and hence there are no individuals who would like to work but are unable,
implying that the unemployment rate is equal to 0. It is important to note that the elasticity
of U with respect to λw is quite large, in the sense that moving from our calibrated value of
.436 to a value of .2 l e a d st oam o r et h a n75% increase in unemployment, while increasing
λw to .6 leads to a drop of more than 25% in unemployment. It follows that our calibration
procedure pins down the value of λw quite precisely.
As we noted earlier, our benchmark equilibrium leads to a ﬂow rate from U to E of .41,
whereas in the data this ﬂow is only .25. The equilibrium ﬂow rate from U to E turns out to
be just slightly less than λw, so that in order to match the ﬂow rate from the data one would
require λw = .26. But as Table 8 shows, this would lead to a steady state unemployment
rate equal somewhat above 10%. Table 9 shows the implications for ﬂows for the λw =0 .4
and 0.2.
32Table 9
Flows For Alternative Calibrations
λw =0 .4 λw =0 .2
FROM TO FROM TO
EUN EUN
E 0.948 0.021 0.031 E 0.959 0.021 0.020
U 0.374 0.561 0.065 U 0.189 0.760 0.051
N 0.031 0.046 0.923 N 0.014 0.058 0.928
The main message from this table is that one can target the ﬂow rate from U to E rather
than the stock of people in U with relatively little eﬀect on the model’s ability to match the
ﬂows out of the E and N states. These alternative calibrations continue to have the same
issue regarding U to N transitions.
Changes in λw also inﬂuence the reasons for transitions out of employment. As explained
above, the greater the frictions the more individuals want to hold on to employment op-
portunities once they have them. As a result, separation shocks become more important in
accounting for transitions out of employment. Table 10 shows this.
Table 10
Eﬀect of λw on Flows out of E
σ shock p shock other
λw =1 .00 .00 0.70 0.30
λw =0 .60 .38 0.49 0.13
λw =0 .40 .42 0.47 0.11
λw =0 .20 .53 0.43 0.04
5 Sensitivity: The Idiosyncratic Shock Process
The previous sections presented results for one particular speciﬁcation of the idiosyncratic
s h o c kp r o c e s s .A ni m po r t a n tq u e s t i o ni st oa s s e s st h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h em o d e l ’ si m p l i c a t i o n s
for worker ﬂows are aﬀected by changes in the values for ρ and σε. Is it the case that the
33model accounts for the ﬂows only if these values lie in very narrow intervals, or do the results
look similar for a wide range of these values? This section addresses this question.
As a ﬁrst step it is instructive to note the importance of the idiosyncratic shocks. To
do this we consider a model that abstracts from the idiosyncratic shocks. In particular, we
shut down the idiosyncratic productivity shocks (ρ =0 , σe =0 )in our benchmark model
and calibrate the model to the same targets. Table 11 shows the results. The parameters are
λw =0 .88, σ =0 .34,a n dα =0 .97.
Table 11
Flows Without s Shocks
FROM TO
EUN
E 0.488 0.021 0.491
U 0.880 0.120 0.000
N 0.880 0.120 0.000
Recall from Table 1 that two of the key features of the actual ﬂow data are the high per-
sistence of the E and N states. Whereas the model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks
matched both of these ﬂows very well, this example misses somewhat with regard to the
persistence in the E state, and by a huge margin with regard to persistence in the N state.15
Spell durations are now equal to 2.0, 1.1 and 1.0 months respectively for E, U,a n dN,v e r s u s
22.5, 2.0 and 14.3 in the data. The short duration of employment and non-participation
spells is striking. The model without idiosyncratic productivity shocks produces far too little
persistence at the individual level. Adding a persistent productivity shock adds a source of
persistence at the individual level and serves to produce a substantial quantitative improve-
15Because the steady state employment rate is .632, the model must necessarily have a fair amount of
persistence in the employment state, in the sense that almost half of those employed this period must also be
employed next period.
34ment in terms of the model’s ability to account for the salient features of the underlying ﬂow
data.
Having established that the presence of idiosyncratic shocks is important in matching the
ﬂows observed in the data, we next examine how the values of the parameters characterizing
this shock process aﬀect the quantitative properties of the ﬂows. Rather than presenting
ﬂow tables for a wide range of speciﬁcations we have decided to simply report the extent of
persistence for each of the three states for diﬀerent combinations of ρ and σε.16 For ease of
interpretation we have again reported the annualized measures of these parameters. Table 12
displays the results when the persistence parameter ρ i sv a r i e d .W en o t et h a tf o re a c hv a l u e
of ρ the remaining parameters of the model are recalibrated so as to hit the same targets as
before. In particular, the two frictional parameters, σ and λw, are recalibrated in each case,
as is the disutility of work parameter α. This last parameter is particularly important, since
changes in the stochastic process for st holding all parameters constant will typically have a
large eﬀect on steady state employment.
Table 12
Eﬀect of ρ on Flows, σε = .21
Data ρ = .97 ρ = .92 ρ = .75 ρ = .50 ρ = .00
E → E. 960 .967 .947 .931 .912 .673
N → N. 919 .971 .923 .882 .838 .319
U → U. 517 .663 .527 .446 .378 .122
(U → E) ∗ U. 014 .018 .023 .025 .027 .033
(N → E) ∗ N. 011 .003 .011 .018 .028 .171
16T h e r ei sas e n s ei nw h i c ht h e s es t a t i s t i c sa l m o s tp r o v i d eac o m p l e t ep i c t u r eo fh o ww e l lt h em o d e lc a p t u r e s
the data. In particular, we know that there are only six indpendent values to start with, and one of these (the
E to U ﬂow) is targeted in the calibration. And the U to N ﬂow tends to be too low and relatively constant
across speciﬁcations.
35In terms of the persistence of the E and N states, we interpret the above results to imply
that as long as the shock process is moderately persistent, say with ρ at least .50, the model
does a reasonable job of capturing the persistence of these two states. A similar result holds
for the persistence of the U state, except that as ρ gets near to unity the persistence in this
state becomes quite large relative to the data.
The last two rows report the mass of workers that ﬂow into E from each of the two other
states in each period. They indicate that the ﬂow of workers from N to E varies quite a lot
as the persistence varies, with particularly poor matches to the data for low values of ρ.A s
ρ decreases the overall ﬂow of workers into E increases, so the aspect of these ﬁnal two rows
that is of greatest interest is the ratio of the two ﬂows. Our reading of this table is that for
either very high or very low persistence the model has trouble matching the observed relative
importance of these two ﬂows.
Table 13 repeats this analysis by varying the value of σε.
Table 13
Eﬀect of σε on Flows, ρ = .92
Data σε = .42 σε = .21 σε = .158 σε = .105 σε = .021
E → E. 960 .960 .947 .937 .921 .903
N → N. 919 .951 .923 .902 .871 .839
U → U. 517 .597 .527 .490 .444 .400
(U → E) ∗ U. 014 .020 .023 .025 .029 .032
(N → E) ∗ N. 011 .006 .011 .015 .021 .029
The table considers standard deviations that range from one-tenth to twice that used in
the benchmark case. The basic ﬁnding of this table is that the basic properties are quite
robust to changes in the standard deviation of the shocks. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the
36greater the standard deviation of the shocks, the greater is the persistence in the individual
states, though in the case of employment this eﬀect is somewhat small. We again remind the
reader that as we change σε we are recalibrating the other parameters (in particular α, λw
and σ) so as to match the same targets as before.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have built a model that features search frictions and a nondegenerate labor supply decision
along the extensive margin. We argue that the steady state equilibrium of our model does
a reasonable job of matching labor market ﬂows between the three labor force states of
employment, unemployment and out of the labor force as long as idiosyncratic shocks are
reasonably persistent. Persistent idiosyncratic shocks play a key role in allowing the model to
match the persistence of the employment and out of the labor force states found in individual
labor market histories. Available evidence suggests that the two prime sources of these
shocks—wage shocks and health status shocks—are both very persistent. It seems reasonable to
posit that family shocks associated with family size and caring for elderly family members are
also likely to be persistent. Whereas for some issues it may not be important to identify the
exact shocks that individuals face, for some issues this may be important. Understanding how
the model behaves in the presence of multiple shocks would also be of interest. Additionally,
it is of interest to consider extensions to our model that will address some of the discrepancies
between the ﬂows in the data and those in the model. Examples might include allowing for
human capital accumulation and depreciation.
37The fact that the model does a good job of matching worker ﬂo w sa sl o n ga st h ep r o c e s s
is somewhat persistent leads us to believe that this very simple model serves as a reasonable
environment for addressing several issues. In Krusell et al (2009), we use this model to
evaluate the relative importance of frictions versus labor supply in the determination of
aggregate employment. This issue gets at a fundamental distinction between commonly used
versions of frictional and frictionless models, which each assume that only one of these factors
is important in determining aggregate employment.
A second issue of interest is to carry out a more comprehensive analysis of tax and transfer
programs in order to address the debate between Prescott (2004) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2006, 2008) concerning the role of beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, Ljungqvist and Sargent argue that
once one takes into account the generosity of beneﬁt systems in many European countries,
Prescott’s model implies implausibly large responses. But Ljungqvist and Sargent do not
distinguish between the unemployed and those out of the labor force, so implicitly assume
that all nonemployed individuals can receive unemployment beneﬁts. In reality there is a
sharp distinction between the beneﬁts that one has access to and prior labor market history.
Understanding the role of these provisions requires a model that can match the heterogeneity
in labor market histories that are found in the data. Our model is one such model.
Third, it would be of interest to examine business cycle ﬂuctuations in our model. Much of
the recent literature that emphasizes the role of frictions in understanding aggregate ﬂuctua-
tions implicitly assumes that the labor supply channel is not operative. Standard frictionless
38models typically get relatively large responses to aggregate shocks because of the labor sup-
ply channel. We believe that our framework is the appropriate setting in which to assess the
relative importance of frictions and labor supply in accounting for aggregate ﬂuctuations in
employment. Related, an important issue for models of aggregate labor market ﬂuctuations
is to not only account for aggregate ﬂuctuations in employment or unemployment, but also
for the patterns found in the data on the cyclical behavior of labor market ﬂows.
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44Appendix
A.1 Data
The Current Population Survey (CPS) reports the labor market status of the respondents
each month that allows the BLS to compute important labor market statistics like the unem-
ployment rate. In particular, in any given month a civilian can be in one of three labor force
states: employed (E), unemployed (U), and not in the labor force (N). The BLS deﬁnitions
for the three labor market states are as follows:
• An individual is counted as employed if he or she did any work at all for pay or proﬁt
during the survey month. This includes part-time or temporary work as well as full-time
year-round employment.
• An individual is considered unemployed if he or she does not have a job, has actively
looked for employment in the past 4 weeks and is currently available to work.
• An individual is classiﬁed as not in the labor force if he or she is included in the labor
force population universe (older than 16 years old, non-military, noninstitutionalized)
but are neither employed nor unemployed.
Households in the CPS are interviewed for several consecutive months. In a given month,
approximately 75 percent of the households were interviewed the previous month. This allows
the BLS to calculate month by month movements that dictate the changes in employment,
unemployment, and not in the labor force. The ﬂows data calculated with the above deﬁni-
45tions of the labor market states have recently been made publicly available by the BLS. (See
http : //www.bls.gov/cps/cpsflows.htm)
However, since our deﬁnition of unemployment in our model is not the same as that of
the BLS, we cannot use the publicly available labor ﬂows data or any of the other estimates
calculated previously (e.g. Shimer (2007), Fujita and Ramey (2009)). We go back to the
C P Sm i c r od a t aa n dr e d e ﬁne the three labor market states consistent with our deﬁnition of
unemployment and calculate the ﬂow rates. Our deﬁnition of E i st h es a m ea st h eB L Sw h i l e
our deﬁnition of U is broader. The BLS asks people if they would like to work independently
of whether they engaged in active search in the previous four weeks. As a result there are
people who are not in the labor force but who actually report that they want a job. We
reclassify these people who are not in the labor force according to the BLS but report that
they want a job as unemployed. Consequently, the stock of unemployed increases and our
alternative unemployment rate becomes considerably higher than the oﬃcial unemployment
rate. For the period 1994-2007 the standard unemployment rate for the US averages 5.1%,
whereas our expanded notion of unemployment averages 8.3%.
A.2 Calculation of the Flows
Calculating the ﬂows data has various problems that have been previously reported. (See
Frazis et al (2005), Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Shimer (2007)). The ﬁrst problem is not
all the respondents stay in the sample for consecutive months; 75 percent are reinterviwed
according to the CPS sampling design. Moreover, many other respondents cannot be found
46in the consecutive month due to various reasons and are reported as missing. The failure
to match individuals in consecutive months is known as margin error and it causes biased
estimates of the ﬂow rates as discussed by Abowd and Zellner (1985) and Fujita and Ramey
(2009).
We apply the procedure that Fujita and Ramey (2009) used to calculate the ﬂow rates
for the BLS deﬁnition of labor market states. To summarize
• We create the raw ﬂows data using the basic monthly CPS data from Unicon’s CPS
Utilities starting (Jan. 1994- Dec. 2007).17
• We retrieve the data by using part of Stata programs written by Robert Shimer.18 The
Stata program matches individuals by household ID, age, sex and race.
• We use the weights provided by the BLS and aggregate the data by the year, month
and speciﬁc ﬂow. We create the stock data by aggregating the monthly data by labor
force status.
• The ﬂows data and the stock data are turned into ﬂow ratios and stock ratios respec-
tively, according to each monthly total.
• To ﬁll in for the missing observation we use the TRAMO (Time Series Regression with
17BLS revised the monthly survey in the summer of 1995 and made it impossible to match household IDs
from June 1995 - August 1995. Thus, we have have 5 missing observations (3 observations unobservable due
to the revision, and 2 observation since we need at least 2 consecutive months worth of data to create a ﬂows
series).
18For additional details, please see Shimer (2007) and his webpage
http://robert.shimer.googlepages.com/ﬂows.”
47ARIMA Noise, Missing Observations and Outliers) program like Fujita and Ramey.
TRAMO is a program developed by Gomez and Maravall. It ﬁlls in the missing data
by interpolating the values and also detects additive and transitory outliers and smooths
them out.
• After the missing values are added, we run a nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression
on the data series.
• We then compute the annual averages of the margin adjusted data and ﬁnally the ﬂow
probabilities are calculated for each year.
• We report the average ﬂow rates for 1994-2007.
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